Value of Evidence on Influence Diagrams by Ezawa, Kazuo J.
212 
Value of Evidence on Influence Diagrams 
KazuoJ. Ezawa 
AT&T Bell Laboratories 
600 Mountain A venue 
Murray Hill, NJ 07974 
Abstract 
In this paper, we introduce evidence 
propagation operations on influence 
diagrams and a concept of value of 
evidence, which measures the value of 
experimentation. Evidence propagation 
operations are critical for the computation 
of the value of evidence, general update 
and inference operations in normative 
expert systems which are based on the 
influence diagram (generalized Bayesian 
network) paradigm. The value of 
evidence allows us to compute directly an 
outcome sensitivity, a value of perfect 
information and a value of control which 
are used in decision analysis (the science 
of decision making under uncertainty). 
More specifically, the outcome sensitivity 
is the maximum difference among the 
values of evidence, the value of perfect 
information is the expected value of the 
values of evidence, and the value of 
control is the optimal value of the values 
of evidence. We also discuss an 
implementation and a relative 
computational efficiency issues related to 
the value of evidence and the value of 
perfect information. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Influence diagrams have been in use for decision 
analysis for the representation of decision problems 
as well as an decision evaluation tool. Evidence 
propagation on probabilistic influence diagrams 
which contain only chance (probabilistic) nodes 
has been previously discussed [Shachter 1990]. In 
this paper we discuss evidence propagation 
operations on influence diagrams and the value of 
evidence. 
Probabilistic expert systems that can interact with 
and interpret real world quantitative data and 
uncertainty have been developed thanks to 
algorithmic advances on evidence propagation 
(probabilistic inference) on Bayesian networks 
[Shachter 1990&1992, Lauritzen 1988, Pearl 1988, 
Jensen 1990]. It replaces a rule-based knowledge 
representation with the Bayesian network based 
knowledge representation. For the development of 
normative expert systems which recommend an 
optimal decision alternative(s) based on 
optimization of an objective function, the use of 
influence diagrams [Shachter 1986, Ezawa 1986 & 
1992] is a logical way to replace a heuristic based 
inference process of expert systems with a full 
fledged decision theoretic process. Evidence 
propagation operations (update based on new 
observation) on the influence diagrams are critical 
for the realization of the normative expert systems. 
Furthermore, these operations can be used for the 
evaluation of influence diagrams in conjunction 
with such as balanced sampling or simulation 
methods (approximal methods) [Shachter 1990]. 
The approximal evaluation methods are needed 
when influence diagrams become too large to 
evaluate using standard evaluation algorithms. 
The value of evidence is a measure of the value of 
observation/experimentation. The value of 
evidence is based on evidence propagation 
operations and standard operations on the influence 
diagram. The need for such a measure is as 
follows: Now, if we want to know the impact of a 
variable X on Bayesian network, we often compute 
the entropy of X. But note that entropy is a 
functional of the distribution of X. It does not 
depend on the actual values (outcomes) of X taken 
by the variable X, but only on the probabilities. In 
the normative expert systems, we need something 
better than that. In decision analysis, we use such 
measures as the outcome sensitivity, the value of 
perfect information and the value of control 
(discussed in section 3) which reflect the actual 
values and probabilities of X to the objective (goal) 
function. Further more we want to have something 
finer than that -Of the variable level, i.e., the 
individual outcome level. For example, for 
variable X, you might be able to perform some 
experiments or tests to verify only selected actual 
values (outcomes). In this case, we want to know 
which particular outcomes have most significant 
impact to the final value {goal). That is the value 
of evidence. Since the value of evidence is on the 
outcome level, it also allows us to unify the 
concepts of the outcome sensitivity, the value of 
perfect infonnation, and the value of control. I.e., 
once you know the value of evidence for each 
outcome, you can define these concepts from the 
value of evidence. 
In this introduction, we briefly describe influence 
diagrams. We discuss evidence propagation in the 
presence of deterministic nodes, decision nodes, 
and a value node in addition to chance nodes in the 
regular influence diagrams in section 2. In section 
3, we define and discuss the value of evidence in 
conjunction with the value of perfect infonnation 
and the value of control. In section 4, we discuss 
the implementation and computational efficiency 
issues related to the value of evidence computation. 
An influence diagram is a graphical representation 
of a decision problem under uncertainty, explicitly 
revealing probabilistic dependence and the flow of 
information. It is an intuitive framework in which 
to formulate problems as perceived by decision 
makers and to incorporate the knowledge of 
experts. It is also a mathematically precise 
description of the problem that can be directly 
evaluated. 
An influence diagram is an acyclic directed graph 
with four types of nodes which represent different 
type of variables and two types of arcs which 
represent relationships between nodes. 
A circle symbolizes a chance node which 
represents uncertain "event" and contains mutually 
exclusive potential outcomes and associated 
probabilities. A double circle symbolizes a 
deterministic node which represents functional 
relationships between nodes (variables) and 
contains a deterministic function that describes the 
relationships. A square symbolizes a decision node 
which represents a decision variable for the 
decision maker and contains decision alternatives. 
A diamond symbolizes a value node {V) which 
represents the goal of the decision problem and 
contains the value function which measures the 
"value." 
An arc into a chance node indicates there is a 
probabilistic dependency between the node and its 
predecessor(s), and it is called a conditional arc. 
An arc into a decision node is an informational arc, 
i.e., before you make a decision, you have 
information related to its predecessor(s). It 
represents time precedence between the decision 
node and its predecessor(s). 
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A successor of node i is a node on a directed path 
emanating from node i. A successor node that is 
adjacent to node i is called a direct successor of the 
node i and denoted as S(i). 
A predecessor of node i is a node on a directed path 
terminating at node i. A predecessor that is 
adjacent to node i is called a direct predecessor of 
node i and is denoted as C(i) (as conditioning 
nodes). 
Each node i has an associated variable Xi, outcome 
space ili, and xi which represents a particular 
outcome of ni. A subset of Oi is denoted by xi. X 
denotes all variables, and D denotes all decision 
variables which is a subset of X in the influence 
diagram. P {Xi} represents the probability 
distribution of the conditionally independent 
variable Xi. P{XiiXj} represents the probability 
distribution of conditionally dependent variable Xi 
given Xj. 
There are three standard (regular) operations in the 
influence diagram evaluation algorithms. One is 
"chance node removal" which is to take the 
expectation of the joint probability given the 
chance node. The second operation is "decision 
node removal" which is to take the maximum 
(minimum) of expected value (objective function 
in the value node) given the alternatives of the 
decision node. The last operation is "arc reversal" 
that is to change the direction of the arc which 
represents an application of Bayes rule. 
2. EVIDENCE PROPAGATION ON 
INFLUENCE DIAGRAMS 
In this section, we discuss three types of evidence 
propagation, I) chance to chance evidence 
propagation and evidence reversal, 2) evidence 
propagation with a deterministic node, and 3) 
evidence propagation with a decision node. 
The instantiation of evidence on a chance node and 
propagation of evidence among chance nodes 
involve the following operations depending on the 
network structure [Sbachter 1990]: 
• 
Evidence absorption: instantiation of evidence Xj 
on node Xj which is just the table lookup of the 
observed outcome, i.e., P{XJ=Xj I XC(XJ)} 
• Evidence propagation: propagation of evidence 
Xj to its successor node i, which is the identification 
of still valid potential outcomes, 
i.e., P{Xi I XC(XI) & XJ=xj}*P{XJ=Xj I XC(XJ)} 
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• Evidence reversal: evidence absorption of Xj on 
XJ and arc reversal between XJ and its predecessor 
XK and the propagation of evidence Xj to XK-
• Evidence Propa2ation to a Detenninistic Node : 
The propagation of evidence Xj to its successor 
node I, which is a function (F) of XJ and others is 
to set XI = Xj in the function F., i.e., P{XI = 
F (XC(I)\I & XI=Xj)} where " \ " indicates 
exclusion of J. 
Figure 1: Evidence Propagation to a Deterministic 
Node 
Note: We can first convert a deterministic node to 
a chance node, and then perform standard evidence 
propagation operations. An advantage of keeping 
it as a deterministic node is that we can save 
computational space better in this fonn in the 
influence diagram. 
• Evidence Reversal to a Detenninistic Node: 
Evidence reversal to a deterministic node requires 
the deterministic node to be converted to a chance 
node flrst, and then perform regular (chance to 
chance) evidence reversal. 
Figure 2: Evidence Reversal to a Deterministic 
Node 
• 
Evidence Prmm2ation to a Decision Node: 
It involves standard evidence propagation and an 
elimination of an arc from J to I (decision node). 
Figure 3: Evidence Propagation to a Decision 
Node 
Proposition 1: 
After the evidence propagation of a chance node I 
to its successors S(J) \ I, if the chance node has a 
decision successor I, we can simply delete the arc 
from the chance node to the decision node. 
Proof: 
After the evidence propagation of chance node J to 
all other successor nodes S(J) \ I, the decision node 
I becomes the only successor of I. Thus J belongs 
to Xc(I)\C(V) where V is a value node. In the 
removal of decision node I, XC(I)\C(V) are 
irrelevant and do not play a role [Shachter 1986, 
Ezawa 1986]. Hence the arc from J to I can be 
eliminated. [] 
• 
Evidence propagation with a Decision Node 
predecessor : In this particular case of evidence 
propagation, there is an issue of what is the 
"evidence," i.e., whether we observe an outcome 
of a node or conditional outcomes of a node. We 
will discuss this issue in section 3 - the value of 
evidence. Here we assume we observe conditional 
outcomes of the node, and observation of an 
unconditional outcome of the node is a special case 
of observation of conditional outcomes. 
Proposition 2: 
A chance node with decision node predecessors can 
propagate evidence with observed outcomes 
identified as conditional i.e., IlK. With the full 
evidence, it contains outcomes of J given all 
decision alternatives of K. After the propagation of 
evidence of {IlK}, decision node K inherits J's 
successors as successors. 
Figure 4: Evidence Propagation with a Decision 
Node Predecessor 
Proof: 
The joint probabilities, P{S(J) U J U C(J)} = 
P{S'(J) U J UK} where S'(J) represents successors 
of J after the arc reversals to all chance nodes of 
C(J). If we apply evidence propagation of J = 
xj*lxk , we get S'(J = Xj*lxk) UK). [] 
It is basically maintaining the dependencies 
between J's successors and K after the evidence 
propagation of J. 
With these operations of evidence propagation on 
influence diagrams, we can now propagate 
evidence on the influence diagram anywhere. In 
the next section, we discuss the value of evidence. 
3. VALUE OF EVIDENCE 
In the process of updating influence diagrams 
through evidence (observation), it is often useful to 
know what evidence we would like to observe, or 
what experiment we should do to receive maximum 
benefit from the observation (e.g., in the case of 
inquiry, what specific question we should ask). We 
call this measure of the value of an experiment as 
the value of evidence (VOE) defined below. 
VOE (XJ = Xj) = EV(X \ XJ, XJ = Xj)- EV(X) 
i.e., the value of evidence of outcome Xj of 
variable XJ is the expected value (EV) of the 
influence diagram with the evidence Xj minus the 
expected value of the influence diagram. Because 
the influence diagrams have value node (value 
function), we can compute this value of evidence 
based on the value function of the value node. 
In the normative expert systems which are based on 
influence diagram paradigm, the evidence 
propagation operation is the most often used 
functionality. It would be convenient if we could 
compute the value of perfect information and the 
value of control from the measure based on 
evidence propagation. The value of evidence is the 
measure which allows us to compute the value of 
perfect information and the value of control. 
Outcome sensitivity can also be computed from the 
value of evidence. 
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The outcome sensitivity determines changes in 
expected value of a given influence diagram and 
takes into account all uncertainty of other chance 
nodes given a specific outcome of a node. The 
outcome sensitivity (OS) is defined by 
OS(XJ) =Max EV(X\XJ, XJ=Xi) -Min EV(X\XJ, 
XJ=Xj) for all OJ. 
We can also define the outcome sensitivity by 
Proposition 3: 
OS(XJ) =Max VOE (X\XJ, XJ=Xj)- Min VOE 
(X\XJ, XJ=Xj) for all OJ. 
Proof: 
OS(XJ) = Max EV(X\XJ, XJ=Xi) -Min EV(X\XJ, 
XJ=Xj) for all OJ. 
=Max (EV(X\XJ,XJ=Xj)-EV(X))-Min(EV(X\X), 
XJ=Xj) EV(X)) for all .O.J. 
=Max VOE(:X\X),XJ=Xi)-MinVOE(X\XJ,XJ=Xj) 
for all .O.J. [] 
I.e., the outcome senstttvtty is the difference 
between the maximum value of the value of 
evidence and the minimum value of the value of 
evidence on the variable XJ. 
This particular sensitivity is different from so 
called "deterministic sensitivity" which set all other 
chance node to the median. 
The value of perfect information is the difference 
between the expected values of knowing the 
outcomes of a node before making a decision and 
not knowing the outcome of the node of a given 
influence diagram in question. The value of 
perfect information (VOPI) is defined as 
VOPI (XJ) = EV(X\{D,XJ}, DIXJ, XJ)- EV(X). 
In the influence diagram operation, to obtain the 
expected value with perfect information, we add an 
arc from the chance node in question to the related 
decision node. The difference in the expected 
values of this modified influence diagram and of 
the original influence diagram is the value of 
perfect information. We call this "standard 
method" of the computation of the value of perfect 
information. When a decision node is a 
predecessor, we perform a special operation which 
we will discuss later. 
We can also define the value of perfect information 
as the expected value of the value of evidence of 
the evidence node J, i.e., 
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Proposition 4: 
VOPI (XJ) = L VOE(XJ =Xj) * P{xj} for ilJ of 
evidence node j. 
Proof: 
VOPI(XJ)=EV(X\{D,XJ}, DlXJ, XJ)-EV(X) 
=(LEV(X\{D,XJ},DIXJ,XJ=xj)*P{xj} )- EV(X) 
=(LEV(X\XJ,XJ"'Xj)*P{xj} )-EV(X) 
:;:;L_(EV(X\XJ, XJ=Xj)-EV(X))*P{ Xj} 
= L VOE(XJ =Xj) * P{xj} 
for ilJ of evidence node j. [] 
In otber words, once tbe evidence Xj is propagated, 
when we make the next decision (reduce decision 
node), tbis information is already incorporated(i.e., 
given the evidence of Xj-) Hence by weighing the 
value of evidence for each Xj with P{ Xj}, we can 
compute the value of perfect information. The 
unconditional probability P{XJ} can always be 
obtained by applying arc reversals between its 
predecessors as long as tbey are not decision nodes. 
In tbe case of decision predecessors, the treatment 
of the probability is discussed in a example later. 
Note that VOPI computed from VOE is the VOPI 
for overall decisions. Only when a decision 
predecessor is involved, we can compute VOPI for 
the decision. Note also a value of evidence could 
be negative, but tbe value of perfect information is 
always greater than or equal to 0. 
The value of control is the difference between the 
expected values of controlling the outcomes of the 
node in question and not controlling it. The value 
of control (V OC) is defined by 
VOC(XJ) =Max EV(X\X), XJ=XJ)- EV(X) for all 
OJ. 
In the influence diagram operation, to obtain the 
expected value with control, we change the chance 
node in question to a decision node. 
The value of control can be directly computed from 
tbe value of evidence. 
Proposition 5: 
VOC (XJ) = Max VOE (XJ = Xj) for OJ of 
evidence node J, if we are maximizing tbe value 
function. 
Proof: 
VOC(XJ)=Max EV(X\XJ,XJ==Xj)- EV(X) 
:;:; Max (EV(X\XJ, XJ=Xj)- EV(X) ) 
=Max VOE (XJ = Xj) for ilJ of evidence node J [J 
In otber words, the evidence absorption is 
controlling of the event, i.e., assuming certainty of 
the outcome. Choosing the best outcome is the 
value of control. Hence by choosing the value of 
evidence which optimizes the value function, we 
get the value of control. 
Now let's discuss the issue of evidence/observation 
of conditional outcomes and unconditional 
outcomes in the case of evidence propagation with 
a decision node predecessor. We discuss this in 
conjunction witb the value of evidence, the value of 
perfect infonnation, and the value of control using 
an example, Mars vs Venus [Matheson, 1990]. 
Mars vs Venus: Consider an hypothetical case of 
sending a landing craft to Mars or Venus. As a 
decision maker, we have a choice of sending the 
craft to Mars or Venus. The probability of success 
of the mission is 60% regardless of the destination. 
The values we receive from the mission is as 
follows: 
Table 1: Mars vs Venus 
Mission 
Destination (Probability) Value 
Mars Success (60%) 50 
Mars Failure (40%) 10 
Venus Success (60%) 100 
Venus Failure (40%) - 10 
Figure 5 shows an influence diagram representation 
of Mars vs Venus problem. Note that an arc from 
the decision node (Destination) to the chance node 
(Mission) is not necessary, since the probability of 
success or failure is independent of the destination. 
But for the sake of the consistency with the original 
example, we avoid modification to the diagram nor 
the changes in probabilities. 
Destination 
Figure 5: Mars vs Venus 
The expected value of this decision problem is 56, 
and optimal destination is Venus. The value of 
evidence for the mission is as follows: 
Table 2: Value of Evidence 
Evidence Destination Value VOE 
Failure Mars 10 -46 
Success Venus 100 +44 
The expected value with perfect information is 64, 
thus the value of perfect information is 8. It is 
computed from the value of evidence using 
infonnation from table I and 2 (i.e., -46 * 0.40 + 
44 * 0.60 = 8.) The value of control is 44 (i.e., the 
maximum value of the value of evidence.) This is 
a "naive" computation of value of perfect 
information (i.e., based on observation of 
unconditional outcomes.) Next, we discuss a more 
sophisticated interpretations of the value of perfect 
information (i.e., based on an observation of 
conditional outcomes.) 
3.2 With Full Evidence 
In the case of value of perfect information, if we 
don't assume conditional independence between 
probability of success in Mars landing and Venus 
landing, we need to reassess these conditional 
probabilities for the computation of the value of 
perfect information for both using and nm using 
value of evidence. For the computation of the 
value of perfect information, since we cannot 
directly reverse the arc between the "destination" 
and the "mission" due to the fact that the 
"destination" is a decision node in Figure 5, we 
need to modify the influence diagram to the one in 
Figure 6, which allows us to add an arc to 
Destination from Mission given Destination. Note 
that as shown in section 2, the value of evidence 
doesn't require this structural modification of the 
influence diagram, and the necessary change in 
outcomes and probability distributions can be 
accommodated internally in "mission" node. 
Figure 6: Modified Mars vs Venus Influence 
Diagram 
Value of Evidence on Influence Diagrams 217 
Table 3: The joint probability distribution for the 
conditional outcomes of Mission given Destination 
Venus: Venus: Sum 
Failure Success 
Mars: Failure 0.354 0.046 0.40 
Mars: Success 0.046 0.554 0.60 
Sum 0.40 0.60 
Figure 7: Mars Vs Venus with Value of Perfect 
Information on Mission given Destination 
The expected value is 56, and optimal destination is 
Venus. The expected value of this mission with 
perfect information is 65.84, and thus the value of 
perfect information is 9.84. For the value of 
evidence for the conditional observation, is as 
follows: 
Table 4: Value of Evidence 
Evidence Desti- Value VOE 
(Observation) nation 
Mars: Failure Mars 10 - 46 
Venus: Failure 
Mars: Success Mars 50 - 6  
Venus: Failure 
Mars: Failure Venus 100 +44 
Venus: Success 
Mars: Success Venus 100 +44 
Venus: Success 
As in the previous example, the value of perfect 
information can be directly computed from table 3 
and 4. The direction of the value of evidence, i.e., 
+ or -, is also informative, it shows the direction of 
expected value's change as we observe more 
evidence. The value of control remains 44. 
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3.3 With Partial Evidence 
In the case with partial evidence for both the value 
of perfect information and the value of evidence 
require further assessment of conditional 
p robability among outcomes, since we observe 
only p ar t  of evidence (conditional outcome). 
Figure 8 shows an influence diagram which 
separates Mars Landing and Venus Landing. 
Destination 
Figure 8: Modified Mars Vs Venus Influence 
Diagram with Dependency between 
Mars and Venus Landings 
The table 5 shows the probability distribution for 
Venus Landing which is derived from Table 4. 
Table 5: The probability distribution for the 
conditional outcomes of 
Venus Landing given Mars Landing 
Venus Venus Uncondi-
Landing: Landing: tiona! 
Failure Success Pro b. 
Mars 
Landing: 0.885 0.115 0.40 
Failure 
Mars 
Landing: 0.077 0.923 0.60 
Success 
Uncondi-
tional 0.4 0.6 
Prob. 
The value of Evidence on Mars Landing is as 
follows: 
Table 6: The Value of Evidence for Mars Landing 
Evidence Destina- Value Value of 
tion Evidence 
Mars 
Landing : Mars 10 - 46 
Failure 
Mars 
Landing: Venus 91.57 35.57 
Success 
The value of perfect information is 2.94 (i.e., -46 * 
0.40 + 35.57 * 0.60), and value of control is 35.57. 
In this section, we defined and discussed the 
concept of value of evidence and relationships 
between the value of evidence and the outcome 
sensitivity, the value of perfect information, and the 
value of control. 
The advantage of the use of value of evidence is 
that we can avoid the unnecessary modification of 
influence diagrams like the one we discussed here. 
Also it allows us to compute the outcome 
sensitivity, the value of perfect information and the 
value of control directly from the value of 
evidence. As we discussed in the next section, it is 
also computationally more efficient in certain 
applications. 
4 IMPLEMENTATION AND 
COMPUTATIONAL ISSUES 
In this section, we discuss two different methods to 
compute the value of evidence, and discuss a 
relative computational efficiency. 
Two methods for the computation of the value of 
evidence are as follows: 
Method 1 (based on Evidence Propagation): 
For an outcome, Xi. of an evidence node I, 
• Perform evidence propagation of Xj, 
• Perform standard reduction of influence diagram, 
• Compute the value of evidence of Xi, 
Repeat this procedure for all Xi of I. 
Method 2 (based on Lock Selected Node): 
• Lock an evidence node I, 
• Perform standard reduction of influence diagram, 
• Compute the value of evidence of all Xi of I. 
In method 2, "lock a node I" means that we put the 
node I to be non-removable node. If we perform 
standard reduction on the influence diagram, we 
get the expected values conditional on the 
outcomes (xis) of the locked node I. The value of 
evidence Xi is this conditional expected value of Xi 
minus the expected value without evidence (as 
defined in the previous section.) 
The method l computes a value of evidence one 
outcome at a time, whereas the method 2 computes 
all the values of evidence at once. 
Now, we compare the computation of the value of 
perfect information, the value of evidence using 
method 1 and 2. We ignore the computational time 
and space required for the conversion of the values 
of evidence to the value of perfect information. 
We show that the computation of the value of 
perfect information using the standard method and 
method 2 are equivalent in terms of maximum 
computational outcome space, and method I is 
more efficient than or at least equal to those two. 
In the reduction (evaluation) of influence diagram, 
one of the most critical space limitation is the 
maximum computational outcome space 
requirement. The computational outcome space of 
a reduction of node J is ns(J)UJUC(J)UC(S(J))· 
So the bottleneck of the evaluation of influence 
diagram is Max. OS(J)UJUC(J)UC(S(J)) for all J in 
the sequence of the reduction of influence diagram. 
I.e., if the maximum computational outcome space 
exceeds the available space in the computer 
(hardware), it simply stops and won't be able to 
evaluate the influence diagram in question. We 
need to be able to evaluate the influence diagram 
before we worry about how fast we can evaluate it. 
Figure 9 shows an example influence diagram with 
an evidence node I and a decision node K. 
Figure 9: Original Influence Diagram 
Figure 10 shows a modified influence diagram for 
the computation of the value of perfect 
information. 
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Figure 10: Influence Diagram for Value of 
Perfect Information 
Figure 1 1  shows a modified influence diagram for 
the computation of the value of evidence. 
Figure 11: Influence Diagram for Value of 
Evidence 
Proposition 6: 
The maximum computational outcome space of the 
value of perfect information using the standard 
method and the method 2 are equivalent. 
Proof: 
If a reducing node J* is not a successor of node 
{IlK} in the sequence of reduction of the influence 
diagram and requires maximum computational 
outcome space, then both computation require the 
same maximum outcome space. In the case of the 
reducing node 1* to be a successor of node {IlK}, 
since until the reduction of decision node K, both 
follow the same order of reduction of nodes, both 
computation require the same maximum outcome 
space.[] 
Proposition 7: 
The maximum computational outcome space of the 
value of perfect information using standard method 
is larger than or equal to that of using method 1. 
Proof: 
If a reducing node J* is not affected by the 
evidence propagation of node {IlK} and requires 
maximum computational outcome space in the 
sequence of reduction of the influence diagram, 
then both computation require the same maximum 
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outcome space. But if the node J* is impacted by 
the evidence propagation of node {IlK}, since arc 
reversal operation and evidence propagation 
operation requires one variable less (i.e., {IlK 
=xiiX k}). the maximum computational outcome 
space requirement for the reduction of node J* is 
less than that of the standard meth od. [] 
Hence in terms of the maximum computational 
requirement, the method l is the most efficient way 
to compute the value of evidence, and the value of 
perfect information. This also holds for the 
computation of the outcome sensitivity and the 
value of control. 
5 SUMMARY 
Evidence propagation operations with 
deterministic, decision, and value nodes on 
influence diagrams and the value of evidence are 
discussed. These ope rations are crucial to use 
influence diagrams in the normative expert systems 
for the general update based on new 
evidence/observation. The value of evidence is 
useful to measure the value of experimentation. 
We can compute the value of perfect information 
and value of control from the values of evidence. 
We also discussed that the efficient methods for the 
computation of value of evidence. 
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